Founding crytpography on oblivious transfer
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Communications of the ACM
Efficient oblivious transfer protocols
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Infrastructure for the quantum internet
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Verifiable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Security of trusted repeater quantum key distribution networks
Journal of Computer Security - EU-Funded ICT Research on Trust and Security
Robuster combiners for oblivious transfer
TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
Secure identification and QKD in the bounded-quantum-storage model
CRYPTO'07 Proceedings of the 27th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Almost-everywhere secure computation
EUROCRYPT'08 Proceedings of the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques 27th annual international conference on Advances in cryptology
On robust combiners for oblivious transfer and other primitives
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
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Any two-party cryptographic primitive can be implemented using quantum communication under the assumption that it is difficult to store a large number of quantum states perfectly. However, achieving reliable quantum communication over long distances remains a difficult problem. Here, we consider a large network of nodes with only neighboring quantum links. We exploit properties of this cloud of nodes to enable any two nodes to achieve security even if they are not directly connected. Our results are based on techniques from classical cryptography and do not resort to technologically difficult procedures like entanglement swapping. More precisely, we show that oblivious transfer can be achieved in such a network if and only if there exists a path in the network between the sender and the receiver along which all nodes are honest. Finally, we show that useful notions of security can still be achieved when we relax the assumption of an honest path. For example, we show that we can combine our protocol for oblivious transfer with computational assumptions such that we obtain security if either there exists an honest path, or, as a backup, at least the adversary cannot solve a computational problem.