Safeware: system safety and computers
Safeware: system safety and computers
Managing Information Security in Healthcare - an Action Research Experience
Proceedings of the IFIP TC11 Fifteenth Annual Working Conference on Information Security for Global Information Infrastructures
HICSS '07 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable
The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable
CRIOP: A Human Factors Verification and Validation Methodology That Works in an Industrial Setting
SAFECOMP '09 Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
Managing Emerging Information Security Risks during Transitions to Integrated Operations
HICSS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 43rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
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In this chapter we have discussed vulnerabilities and mitigating actions to improve safety, security and continuity of the information and process infrastructure used in the oil, gas and petrochemical sector. An accident in the oil and gas industry can become a major disaster, and the suggested steps should help mitigate some of these hazards. This chapter consist of four parts, described in the following: 1. Background and Introduction --- the Oil, Gas and Petrochemical Sector 2. Accidents, Threats and Resilience in the Oil, Gas and Petrochemical Sector 3. Risk Mitigation and Improvement of Resilience in the Sector 4. Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Exploration and Research The introduction describes the general challenges to explore oil and gas reserves in difficult areas. The regulation philosophy and regulation strategy of the oil and gas sector is discussed. A description of process control systems (i.e. supervisory control and data acquisition - SCADA systems) and information and communication technology (ICT) is given. Challenges posed by integration of SCADA and ICT systems are discussed. Challenges raised by new technology used in the oilfields of the future are mentioned. In the next section we are giving a theoretical description of how accidents are analysed and structured. Then we have described major accidents in the oil and gas sector. Next we have described specific vulnerabilities of integration of ICT and SCADA systems, based on an empirical survey. This is followed by a discussion of technical risks related to integration of ICT and SCADA systems. In the third section we have described how the challenges and risks identified can be mitigated through rule compliance and risk management. We are suggesting a set of "best practices" to mitigate the risks, explored with success in Norway. Our perspective has been to include technology, organization and human factors in risk management. Due to the increased complexity and uncertainty in the sector we have suggested an improved risk assessment including resilience as a strategy. To expand the field of learning we are suggesting exploring successful recoveries in addition to accidents and incidents. Action research has been suggested as a method to improve safety based on a participatory and reflective discourse during risk assessment. In the last section we have listed our conclusion and are suggesting areas of further exploration and research. The main conclusion is to design for resilience and safety and to establish common risk perceptions through scenario analysis.