Hypervisor-based protection of sensitive files in a compromised system

  • Authors:
  • Junqing Wang;Miao Yu;Bingyu Li;Zhengwei Qi;Haibing Guan

  • Affiliations:
  • Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, China;Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, China;Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, China;Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, China;Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, China

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
  • Year:
  • 2012

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

One of the most fundamental issues in computer security is protecting sensitive files from unauthorized access. Traditional file protection tools run inside the target operating system, which hosts sensitive files. This makes previous approaches vulnerable in face of a compromised OS. To address this limitation, recent approaches seek for a good isolation by putting file system into a dedicated virtual machine or by using a network file system. However, they suffer a sharp increase in trusted computing base size which degrades their reliability. In this paper, we present Filesafe, a special purpose hy-pervisor aimed at protecting sensitive files in a compromised operating system. It bridges the semantic gap between guest OS and hypervisor by reconstructing file hierarchy from raw data, which incurs no runtime overhead. By enforcing security policies created in hypervisor, Filesafe could prevent sensitive files from unauthorized access even if they have kernel privileges in guest OS. We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype on Windows XP with FAT32 file system. Furthermore, we evaluate Filesafe's performance and code size to demonstrate it is practical in real world scenarios.