Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Identity-based key agreement protocols from pairings
International Journal of Information Security
A Schnorr-Like Lightweight Identity-Based Signature Scheme
AFRICACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Cryptology in Africa: Progress in Cryptology
Okamoto-Tanaka revisited: fully authenticated diffie-hellman with minimal overhead
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Security of two-party identity-based key agreement
Mycrypt'05 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Progress in Cryptology in Malaysia
Making the diffie-hellman protocol identity-based
CT-RSA'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
Galindo-Garcia identity-based signature revisited
ICISC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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Identity-based authenticated key exchange (IBAKE) protocol is one of the most important cryptographic primitives that enables two parties using their identities to establish their common secret keys without sending and verifying public key certificates. Recently, many works have been dedicated to design efficient and secure IBAKE protocols without bilinear pairings which need the heavy computational cost. Unfortunately, most of the proposed protocols cannot provide Perfect Forward Security (PFS) which is a major security goal of authenticated key exchange protocols. In this paper we present an efficient and provably secure IBAKE protocol with PFS. Our protocol relies on the technique known as the concatenated Schnorr signature and it could be viewed as a variant of the protocol proposed by Fiore et al. in 2010. By using the Canetti-Krawczyk security model, we prove that the protocol is secure with PFS under the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. The protocol is of interest since it offers a remarkable combination of advanced security properties and efficiency and its security proof is succinct and intelligible.