Mechanism design for decentralized vehicle routing problem

  • Authors:
  • Mohammed Saleh;Andrei Soeanu;Sujoy Ray;Mourad Debbabi;Jean Berger;Abdeslem Boukhtouta

  • Affiliations:
  • Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada;Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada;Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada;Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada;Defence Research & Development Canada-Valcartier, Val-Belair, QC, Canada;Defence Research & Development Canada-Valcartier, Val-Belair, QC, Canada

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In this paper, we present a strategyproof mechanism design to tackle the multi-depot vehicle routing problem in multi-agent setting. In a small-world network environment (any node is connected to every other node through a short path) wherein different self-interested agencies are controlling their own vehicle fleets, we use an innovative game theoretic approach to distribute products to customers without any central authority. The game is using a reverse Vickrey auction that takes place in several rounds until all customers are assigned. Payments are given to depots as incentive for fairness of serving cost offering. The procedure leads to overall near-optimal routing for serving all customers. We briefly describe the use of a heuristic approach to solve the game-based procedure in bounded time and memory. We also provide benchmarks for several known problem instances.