Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
A practical protocol for large group oriented networks
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Protocols for group oriented secret sharing
Information Processing Letters
Communications of the ACM
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Society and Group Oriented Cryptography: A New Concept
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Shared Generation of Authenticators and Signatures (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Hiding information and signatures in trapdoor knapsacks
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
A new generalized group-oriented cryptoscheme without trusted centers
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
An ID-based cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm problem
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Inspired from Tsujii and Itoh's system, we propose an ID-based group-oriented cryptosystem and its digital signature scheme. In the proposed cryptosystem, any entity for decrypting or signing a message is dedicated to ''group'', instead of ''individual''. A group, consisting of a set of individuals, could be specified as high-authorized, low-authorized or threshold-authorized according to the predefined authorization strategy. Any sender can encrypt a message addressed to a group with only knowing the group's identity and the corresponding public information, so that individuals of the group should cooperate to recover the message by following the authorization strategy. For signing a message, individuals of the group should cooperate to generate a group signature by following the authorization strategy, so that any verifier can validate the group signature with only requiring the group's identity and the corresponding public information. The sender of a secret message or the verifier of a group signature does not necessarily know the authorization strategy within that group in advance.