An automatic search for security flaws in key management schemes
Computers and Security
The Correctness of Crypto Transaction Sets
Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Attacks on Cryptoprocessor Transaction Sets
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Experience Using a Low-Cost FPGA Design to Crack DES Keys
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Analysing PKCS#11 Key Management APIs with Unbounded Fresh Data
Foundations and Applications of Security Analysis
Towards a Type System for Security APIs
Foundations and Applications of Security Analysis
Type-based analysis of PIN processing APIs
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Attacking and fixing PKCS#11 security tokens
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Formal security analysis of PKCS#11 and proprietary extensions
Journal of Computer Security - 7th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'07)
Reasoning with past to prove PKCS#11 keys secure
FAST'10 Proceedings of the 7th International conference on Formal aspects of security and trust
Secure recharge of disposable RFID tickets
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
Concepts and proofs for configuring PKCS#11
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
Type-based analysis of key management in PKCS#11 cryptographic devices
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Principles
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PKCS#11, is a security API for cryptographic tokens. It is known to be vulnerable to attacks which can directly extract, as cleartext, the value of sensitive keys. In particular, the API does not impose any limitation on the different roles a key can assume, and it permits to perform conflicting operations such as asking the token to wrap a key with another one and then to decrypt it. Fixes proposed in the literature, or implemented in real devices, impose policies restricting key roles and token functionalities. In this paper we define a simple imperative programming language, suitable to code PKCS#11 symmetric key management, and we develop a type-based analysis to prove that the secrecy of sensitive keys is preserved under a certain policy. We formally analyse existing fixes for PKCS#11 and we propose a new one, which is type-checkable and prevents conflicting roles by deriving different keys for different roles.