A core calculus for provenance

  • Authors:

  • Umut A. Acar;Amal Ahmed;James Cheney;Roly Perera

  • Affiliations:

  • Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Germany;Indiana University;University of Edinburgh, UK;Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Germany

  • Venue:
  • POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Provenance is an increasing concern due to the revolution in sharing and processing scientific data on the Web and in other computer systems. It is proposed that many computer systems will need to become provenance-aware in order to provide satisfactory accountability, reproducibility, and trust for scientific or other high-value data. To date, there is not a consensus concerning appropriate formal models or security properties for provenance. In previous work, we introduced a formal framework for provenance security and proposed formal definitions of properties called disclosure and obfuscation This paper develops a core calculus for provenance in programming languages. Whereas previous models of provenance have focused on special-purpose languages such as workflows and database queries, we consider a higher-order, functional language with sums, products, and recursive types and functions. We explore the ramifications of using traces based on operational derivations for the purpose of comparing other forms of provenance.We design a rich class of provenance views over traces. Finally, we prove relationships among provenance views and develop some solutions to the disclosure and obfuscation problems.