Service contracts: A stochastic model

Authors:
E Ashgarizadeh;D. N. P Murthy
Affiliations:
Department of Mechanical Engineering The University of Queensland Brisbane, Australia, Q 4072;Department of Mechanical Engineering The University of Queensland Brisbane, Australia, Q 4072
Venue:
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Year:
2000

Citing 1
Cited 1

Fundamentals of queueing theory (2nd ed.).

Fundamentals of queueing theory (2nd ed.).

A stochastic model on an additional warranty service contract

Computers & Mathematics with Applications

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.98

Visualization

Abstract

There is a growing trend to outsource maintenance where equipment failures are rectified by an external agent under a service contract. The agent's profit is influenced by many factors-the terms of the contract, equipment reliability, and the number of customers being serviced. The paper develops a stochastic model to study the impact of these on the agent's expected profit and the agent's optimal strategies using a game theoretic formulation.