Pseudorandom number generation based on controllable cellular automata
Future Generation Computer Systems - Special issue: Advanced services for clusters and internet computing
On the effectiveness of address-space randomization
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
DieHard: probabilistic memory safety for unsafe languages
Proceedings of the 2006 ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation
Comprehensively and efficiently protecting the heap
Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Non-control-data attacks are realistic threats
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
DIMVA '08 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment
Efficient protection against heap-based buffer overflows without resorting to magic
ICICS'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Editorial: Special section: Trusting software behavior
Future Generation Computer Systems
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Since pointer variables frequently cause programs to crash in unexpected ways, they often pose vulnerability abused as immediate or intermediate targets. Although code pointer attacks have been historically dominant, data pointer attacks are also recognized as realistic threats. This paper presents how to secure heap memory from data pointer attacks, in particular, heap overflow attacks. Our protection scheme encrypts the data pointers used for linking free chunks, and decrypts the pointers only before dereferencing. We also present a list structure with duplicate links that is harder to break than the conventional linked list structure. Our experiment shows that the proposed data pointer encoding is effective and has slightly better performance than the integrity check of link pointers in GNU's standard C library.