On the Security of HB# against a Man-in-the-Middle Attack
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
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INDOCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
Tree-based RFID authentication protocols are definitively not privacy-friendly
RFIDSec'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Radio frequency identification: security and privacy issues
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Journal of Computer Security - 2010 Workshop on RFID Security (RFIDSec'10 Asia)
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GHB#: a provably secure HB-like lightweight authentication protocol
ACNS'12 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
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HB+ is a lightweight protocol secure against active attacks but only in a detection based model. Since its introduction at Crypto'05 by Juels and Weis, many workers have tried to enhance its security. We here propose a new approach to achieve resistance against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Our requirements - in terms of extra communications and hardware - are surprisingly low.