Hustling in repeated zero-sum games with imperfect execution

Authors:
Christopher Archibald;Yoav Shoham
Affiliations:
Stanford University;Stanford University
Venue:
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Year:
2011

Citing 3
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Abstract

We study repeated games in which players have imperfect execution skill and one player's true skill is not common knowledge. In these settings the possibility arises of a player "hustling", or pretending to have lower execution skill than they actually have. Focusing on repeated zero-sum games, we provide a hustle-proof strategy; this strategy maximizes a player's payoff, regardless of the true skill level of the other player.