Manipulation in group argument evaluation

Authors:
Martin Caminada;Gabriella Pigozzi;Mikołaj Podlaszewski
Affiliations:
SnT, Université du Luxembourg, Luxembourg;LAMSADE, Université Paris-Dauphine, Paris, France;ILIAS / SnT, Université du Luxembourg, Luxembourg
Venue:
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Year:
2011

Citing 5
Cited 2

On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games

Artificial Intelligence
On the merging of Dung's argumentation systems

Artificial Intelligence
Collective argument evaluation as judgement aggregation

Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
On judgment aggregation in abstract argumentation

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
On the issue of reinstatement in argumentation

JELIA'06 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence

Quantifying disagreement in argument-based reasoning

Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Introduction to judgment aggregation

ESSLLI'10 Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ESSLLI 2010, and ESSLLI 2011 conference on Lectures on Logic and Computation

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Given an argumentation framework and a group of agents, the individuals may have divergent opinions on the status of the arguments. If the group needs to reach a common position on the argumentation framework, the question is how the individual evaluations can be mapped into a collective one. This problem has been recently investigated by Caminada and Pigozzi. In this paper, we investigate the behaviour of two of such operators from a social choice-theoretic point of view. In particular, we study under which conditions these operators are Pareto optimal and whether they are manipulable.