Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Customer coalitions in the electronic marketplace
AGENTS '00 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents
Computers and Intractability; A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability; A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Searching for Optimal Coalition Structures
ICMAS '00 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000)
Generating Coalition Structures with Finite Bound from the Optimal Guarantees
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Overlapping coalition formation for efficient data fusion in multi-sensor networks
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
An anytime algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
Coalition structure generation in multi-agent systems with positive and negative externalities
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations
CP'09 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Principles and practice of constraint programming
Coalitional games via network flows
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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Coalition formation is a fundamental research topic in multi-agent systems. In this context, while it is desirable to generate a coalition structure that maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, the space of possible solutions is often too large to allow exhaustive search. Thus, a fundamental open question in this area is the following: Can we search through only a subset of coalition structures, and be guaranteed to find a solution that is within a desirable bound β from optimum? If so, what is the minimum such subset?. To date, the above question has only been partially answered by Sandholm et al. in their seminal work on anytime coalition structure generation [Sandholm et al., 1999]. More specifically, they identified minimum subsets to be searched for two particular bounds: β = n and β = ⌈n/2⌉. Nevertheless, the question remained open for other values of β. In this paper, we provide the complete answer to this question.