Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: industrial track
Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Game theory and human behavior: challenges in security and sustainability
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
PROTECT: a deployed game theoretic system to protect the ports of the United States
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Computing optimal strategy against quantal response in security games
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
A robust approach to addressing human adversaries in security games
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Designing better strategies against human adversaries in network security games
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Game theory for security: an important challenge for multiagent systems
EUMAS'11 Proceedings of the 9th European conference on Multi-Agent Systems
Modeling human adversary decision making in security games: an initial report
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Planning and learning in security games
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Scaling-up security games with boundedly rational adversaries: a cutting-plane approach
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Recent real-world deployments of Stackelberg security games make it critical that we address human adversaries' bounded rationality in computing optimal strategies. To that end, this paper provides three key contributions: (i) new efficient algorithms for computing optimal strategic solutions using Prospect Theory and Quantal Response Equilibrium; (ii) the most comprehensive experiment to date studying the effectiveness of different models against human subjects for security games; and (iii) new techniques for generating representative payoff structures for behavioral experiments in generic classes of games. Our results with human subjects show that our new techniques outperform the leading contender for modeling human behavior in security games.