Artificial Intelligence
Knowlege in action: logical foundations for specifying and implementing dynamical systems
Knowlege in action: logical foundations for specifying and implementing dynamical systems
Knowledge, action, and the frame problem
Artificial Intelligence
Knowledge forgetting: Properties and applications
Artificial Intelligence
On the progression of situation calculus basic action theories: resolving a 10-year-old conjecture
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
On first-order definability and computability of progression for local-effect actions and beyond
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Bisimulation quantified logics: undecidability
FSTTCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
Forgetting for answer set programs revisited
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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In a seminal paper, Lin and Reiter introduced the notion of progression for basic action theories in the situation calculus. Earlier works by Moore, Scherl and Levesque extended the situation calculus to account for knowledge. In this paper, we study progression of knowledge in the situation calculus. We first adapt the concept of bisimulation from modal logic and extend Lin and Reiter's notion of progression to accommodate knowledge. We show that for physical actions, progression of knowledge reduces to forgetting predicates in first-order modal logic. We identify a class of first-order modal formulas for which forgetting an atom is definable in first-order modal logic. This class of formulas goes beyond formulas without quantifyingin. We also identify a simple case where forgetting a predicate reduces to forgetting a finite number of atoms. Thus we are able to show that for local-effect physical actions, when the initial KB is a formula in this class, progression of knowledge is definable in first-order modal logic. Finally, we extend our results to the multi-agent case.