Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism

Authors:
Mourad BaïOu;Michel Balinski
Affiliations:
Laboratoire LIMOS, Université Clermont II, Campus des Cézeax, B.P. 125-63173 Aubière Cedex, France and ícole Polytechnique, Laboratoire d'íconométrie, France;CNRS and ícole Polytechnique, Laboratoire d'íconométrie, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France
Venue:
Operations Research Letters
Year:
2007

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Abstract

The stable allocation problem is the generalization of (0,1)-matching problems to the allocation of real numbers (hours or quantities) between two separate sets of agents. The same unique-optimal matching (for one set of agents) is characterized by each of three properties: ''efficiency'', ''monotonicity'', and ''strategy-proofness''.