Survey: A note on proofs of existence of Nash equilibria in finite strategic games, of two players

Authors:
Paul G. Spirakis
Affiliations:
Computer Engineering and Informatics Department (CEID), University of Patras, Rion, 26500 Patras, Greece and Research Academic Computer Technology Institute (RACTI), P.O. Box 1382, N. Kazantzaki S ...
Venue:
Computer Science Review
Year:
2009

Citing 1
Cited 0

On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence

Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue: 31st IEEE conference on foundations of computer science, Oct. 22–24, 1990

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Known general proofs of Nash's Theorem (about the existence of Nash Equilibria (NEa) in finite strategic games) rely on the use of a fixed point theorem (e.g. Brouwer's or Kakutani's). While it seems that there is no general way of proving the existence of Nash equilibria without the use of a fixed point theorem, there do however exist some (not so common in the CS literature) proofs that seem to indicate alternative proof paths, for games of two players. This note discusses two such proofs.