On the emergence of social conventions: modeling, analysis, and simulations
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Frontiers in Social Dilemmas Research
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The Knowledge Engineering Review
A Report on Expert Assistants at the Autonomous Agents Conference
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Robust agent teams via socially-attentive monitoring
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On the synthesis of useful social laws for artificial agent societies
AAAI'92 Proceedings of the tenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Constraining autonomy through norms
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Source Norms and Self-regulated Institutions
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Meta-agency and individual power
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In this paper, the problem of social order posed by infosocieties is illustrated and solutions are discussed. Two main solutions are currently implemented in the fields of Artificial Societies and Multiagent Systems, i.e. Evolutionary Algorithms, on one hand, and Designed Institutions, on the other. Both proceed from controversial assumptions. Evolutionary Algorithms are based upon the idea that reproduction and imitation of fit individuals yield social evolution. However, this idea has been efficaciously [Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 1 (1998) 3] questioned. The complementary solution, i.e. Designed Institutions, is based upon systems of incentives and sanctions. In this paper, these are argued to be unreliable and even counterproductive, especially when natural agents are involved. Emergent social Institutions and distributed control are thus discussed as an alternate solution to the problem of social order. Hypotheses about the co-evolutionary process, including mental and social structures, leading to Emergent Institutions are discussed, and advantages over the preceding solutions are illustrated. Unlike Evolutionary Algorithms, Emergent Institutions are based upon (implicit) social norms and reputation. Unlike Designed Institutions, Emergent Institutions give rise to spontaneous social control, which is more efficient and less costly than centralised control. Finally, the role of Emergent Institutions in infosocieties is examined.