An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents
OPL Script: Composing and Controlling Models
Selected papers from the Joint ERCIM/Compulog Net Workshop on New Trends in Contraints
Decentralized Mechanism Design for Supply Chain Organizations Using an Auction Market
Information Systems Research
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Private collaborative forecasting and benchmarking
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Designing And Managing The Supply Chain
Designing And Managing The Supply Chain
Efficient Auction Mechanisms for Supply Chain Procurement
Management Science
Fostering the Uptake of Secure Multiparty Computation in E-Commerce
ARES '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Third International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Exploring bidding strategies for market-based scheduling
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Modeling and evaluating information leakage caused by inferences in supply chains
Computers in Industry
On the complexity of scheduling tasks with discrete starting times
Operations Research Letters
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Services providers, such as public healthcare systems and government agencies, are under tremendous pressure to reduce costs and improve service quality. Scheduling is an important managerial component which has considerable impact on both the costs and quality of services. Service providers need customers' availability information to improve resource utilization. On the other hand, customers may be of ''two minds'' about communicating their private information. While communicating certain amount of availability might be necessary in order to obtain preferred schedules, too much communication place a potential cost due to privacy loss. In this paper, we present a bidding-based mechanism which aims at generating high quality schedules and, at the same time, protecting customers' privacy. We show that, under the proposed bidding procedure, myopic bidding is the dominant strategy for customers. We also evaluate the privacy and efficiency performance of the proposed mechanism through a computational study.