Detecting Malicious JavaScript Code in Mozilla
ICECCS '05 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Engineering of Complex Computer Systems
Defeating script injection attacks with browser-enforced embedded policies
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
BrowserShield: Vulnerability-driven filtering of dynamic HTML
ACM Transactions on the Web (TWEB)
Lightweight self-protecting JavaScript
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security
Language-Based Isolation of Untrusted JavaScript
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Object views: fine-grained sharing in browsers
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web
Isolating JavaScript with filters, rewriting, and wrappers
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Object Capabilities and Isolation of Untrusted Web Applications
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
ConScript: Specifying and Enforcing Fine-Grained Security Policies for JavaScript in the Browser
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Proxies: design principles for robust object-oriented intercession APIs
Proceedings of the 6th symposium on Dynamic languages
AdJail: practical enforcement of confidentiality and integrity policies on web advertisements
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Automated Analysis of Security-Critical JavaScript APIs
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Towards Fine-Grained Access Control in JavaScript Contexts
ICDCS '11 Proceedings of the 2011 31st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
ADsafety: type-based verification of JavaScript Sandboxing
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
WebJail: least-privilege integration of third-party components in web mashups
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
IceShield: detection and mitigation of malicious websites with a frozen DOM
RAID'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Security of web mashups: a survey
NordSec'10 Proceedings of the 15th Nordic conference on Information Security Technology for Applications
Safe wrappers and sane policies for self protecting javascript
NordSec'10 Proceedings of the 15th Nordic conference on Information Security Technology for Applications
JSand: complete client-side sandboxing of third-party JavaScript without browser modifications
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Efficient dynamic access analysis using JavaScript proxies
Proceedings of the 9th symposium on Dynamic languages
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The large majority of websites nowadays embeds third-party JavaScript into their pages, coming from external partners. Ideally, these scripts are benign and come from trusted sources, but over time, these third-party scripts can start to misbehave, or to come under control of an attacker. Unfortunately, the state-of-practice integration techniques for third-party scripts do not impose restrictions on the execution of JavaScript code, allowing such an attacker to perform unwanted actions on behalf of the website owner and/or website visitor. In this paper, we present a two-tier sandbox architecture to enable a website owner to enforce modular fine-grained security policies for potential untrusted third-party JavaScript code. The architecture contains an outer sandbox that provides strong baseline isolation guarantees with generic, coarse-grained policies and an inner sandbox that enables fine-grained, stateful policy enforcement specific to a particular untrusted application. The two-tier approach ensures that the application-specific policies and untrusted code are by default confined to a basic security policy, without imposing restrictions on the expressiveness of the policies. Our proposed architecture improves upon the state-of-the-art as it does not depend on browser modification nor preprocessing or transformation of untrusted code, and allows the secure enforcement of fine-grained, stateful access control policies. We have developed a prototype implementation on top of a open-source sandbox library in the ECMAScript 5 specification, and applied it to a representative online advertisement case study to validate the feasibility and security of the proposed architecture.