When Virtual Is Better Than Real
HOTOS '01 Proceedings of the Eighth Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems
Terra: a virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Attestation-based policy enforcement for remote access
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure coprocessor-based intrusion detection
EW 10 Proceedings of the 10th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
QEMU, a fast and portable dynamic translator
ATEC '05 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Establishing the genuinity of remote computer systems
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Copilot - a coprocessor-based kernel runtime integrity monitor
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Design and implementation of a TCG-based integrity measurement architecture
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
SecVisor: a tiny hypervisor to provide lifetime kernel code integrity for commodity OSes
Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles
Stealthy malware detection through vmm-based "out-of-the-box" semantic view reconstruction
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Lares: An Architecture for Secure Active Monitoring Using Virtualization
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Guest-Transparent Prevention of Kernel Rootkits with VMM-Based Memory Shadowing
RAID '08 Proceedings of the 11th international symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
A Study of the Packer Problem and Its Solutions
RAID '08 Proceedings of the 11th international symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Hypervisor support for identifying covertly executing binaries
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Secure in-VM monitoring using hardware virtualization
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A forced sampled execution approach to kernel rootkit identification
RAID'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection
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As more and more virtual machines (VM) are packed into a physical machine, refactoring common kernel components shared by the virtual machines running on the same physical machine significantly reduces the overall resource consumption. A refactored kernel component typically runs on a special VM called a virtual appliance. Because of the semantics gap in Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL)-based virtualization, a physical machine's virtual appliance requires the support of per-VM in-guest agents to perform VM-specific operations such as kernel data structure access and modification. To simplify deployment, these agents must be injected into guest virtual machines without requiring any manual installation. Moreover, it is essential to protect the integrity of in-guest agents at run time, especially when the underlying refactored kernel service is security-related. This paper describes the design, implementation and evaluation of a surreptitious kernel agent deployment and execution mechanism called SADE that requires zero installation effort and effectively hides the execution of agent code. To demonstrate the efficacy of SADE, we describe a signature-based memory scanning virtual appliance that uses SADE to inject its in-guest kernel agents without any support from the injected virtual machine, and show that both the start-up overhead and the run-time performance penalty of SADE are quite modest in practice.