Traffic analysis: protocols, attacks, design issues, and open problems
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Capacity is the wrong paradigm
Proceedings of the 2002 workshop on New security paradigms
A Secure Data Hiding Scheme for Two-Color Images
ISCC '00 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC 2000)
Reversible Watermarking with Subliminal Channel
Information Hiding
A traceable E-cash transfer system against blackmail via subliminal channel
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
The dark side of threshold cryptography
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Hiding information in multi level security systems
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
A digital signature with multiple subliminal channels and its applications
Computers & Mathematics with Applications
A fair online payment system for digital content via subliminal channel
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
A framework for avoiding steganography usage over HTTP
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
A subliminal channel in secret block ciphers
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Two extensions of the ring signature scheme of Rivest-Shamir-Taumann
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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In 1978 the United States was considering adopting a national security protocol designed to enable the USSR to verify how many Minuteman missiles the United States had emplaced in a field of 1000 silos without revealing which silos actually contained missiles. For this protocol to have been acceptable to the USSR, the messages would have had to be digitally signed with signatures which the USSR could verify were authentic, but which the United States could not forge. Subliminal channels were the discovery that these digital signatures could host undetectable covert channels. In general, any time redundant information is introduced into a communication to provide an overt function such as digital signatures, error detection and/or correction, authentication, etc. it may be possible to subvert the purported function to create a covert (subliminal) communications channel. This paper recounts the development of subliminal channels from their origins when only a couple of bits could be communicated covertly to today when potentially a couple of hundred bits can be concealed in signatures generated using the most popular digital signature schemes