Relevance of massively distributed explorations of the internet topology: qualitative results
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Robustness of complex communication networks under link attacks
ICAIT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Advanced Infocomm Technology
Topological analysis of a two coupled evolving networks model for business systems
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Internet core topology mapping and analysis
Computer Communications
Model for router-level internet topology based on attribute evolution
IEEE Communications Letters
NETWORKING'07 Proceedings of the 6th international IFIP-TC6 conference on Ad Hoc and sensor networks, wireless networks, next generation internet
Network reliability with geographically correlated failures
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Assessing the vulnerability of replicated network services
Proceedings of the 6th International COnference
Attack resiliency of network topologies
PDCAT'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing: applications and Technologies
Assessing the vulnerability of the fiber infrastructure to disasters
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The resilience of WDM networks to probabilistic geographical failures
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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Recent advances in scale-free networks have claimed that their topologies are very weak against attacks. The inhomogeneous connectivity distribution of large-scale current communication networks, such as the Internet, could be exploited by evil hackers in order to damage these systems. However, there have not been many studies on the approaches and consequences of such targeted attacks. In this paper, we propose an in-depth study of the Internet topology robustness to attacks at the network layer. Several attacking techniques are presented, as well as their effects on the connectivity of the Internet. We show that although the removal of a small fraction of nodes (less than 10%) can damage the Internet connectivity, such a node removal attack would still require a large amount of work to be carried out. To achieve this, we study in detail the interactions between the intradomain and interdomain levels of the Internet through the use of an overlay.