Cost sharing with network coding in two-way relay networks
Allerton'09 Proceedings of the 47th annual Allerton conference on Communication, control, and computing
A game-theoretic analysis of inter-session network coding
ICC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Communications
Bargaining and price-of-anarchy in repeated inter-session network coding games
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Rate control with pairwise intersession network coding
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
On the Multiple-Unicast Capacity of 3-Source, 3-Terminal Directed Acyclic Networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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To implement network coding, users need to coordinate and cooperate with respect to their strategies in terms of duplicating and transmitting side information across specific parts of the network. In unicast applications where users have no inherent interest in providing (or concealing) their information to (or from) any destinations except for their unique one, this assumption becomes critical in the face of users' autonomy. This paper addresses the issue of cooperation in unicast network coding via a game theoretic approach. Implementation of a given network coding scheme induces a network coding game among source-destination pairs (users). In a network with autonomous and rational unicast flows, the equilibrium properties (as well as efficiency) of a network coding scheme is shown to be related to the properties of the corresponding network coding game. In a simple generalization of butterfly networks with two users, we propose a network coding scheme whose capacity achieving operation coincides with users' dominant strategies.