A formal protection model of security in centralized, parallel, and distributed systems
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Cost profile of a highly assured, secure operating system
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Database Concurrency Control in Multilevel Secure Database Management Systems
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
A security domain model to assess software for exploitable covert channels
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Architectural Refinement and Notions of Intransitive Noninterference
ESSoS '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems
Access Control and Information Flow in Transactional Memory
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
seL4: formal verification of an OS kernel
Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 22nd symposium on Operating systems principles
Ownership Downgrading for Ownership Types
APLAS '09 Proceedings of the 7th Asian Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems
On intransitive non-interference in some models of concurrency
Foundations of security analysis and design VI
Dependable and Historic Computing
Deciding selective declassification of petri nets
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Conditional information flow policies and unwinding relations
TGC'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Trustworthy Global Computing
Intransitive noninterference in nondeterministic systems
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
What, indeed, is intransitive noninterference?
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Coinductive unwinding of security-relevant hyperproperties
NordSec'12 Proceedings of the 17th Nordic conference on Secure IT Systems
Noninterference for operating system kernels
CPP'12 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Certified Programs and Proofs
Comprehensive formal verification of an OS microkernel
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
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A noninterference formulation of MLS applicable to the Secure Ada® Target (SAT) Abstract Model is developed. An analogous formulation is developed to handle the SAT type enforcement policy. Unwinding theorems are presented for both MLS and Multidomain Security (MDS) and the SAT Abstract Model is shown to satisfy both MLS and MDS. Generalizations and extensions are also considered.