Optimal precoding for bi-directional MIMO transmission with network coding
WASA'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Wireless algorithms, systems, and applications
A radio resource management framework for opportunistic TVWS access
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on High performance mobile opportunistic systems
A stackelberg game for spectrum leasing in cooperative cognitive radio networks
International Journal of Automation and Computing
A radio resource management framework for TVWS exploitation under an auction-based approach
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Network and Service Management
FMAC for coexisting ad hoc cognitive radio networks
WASA'13 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications
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Cognitive radio is a promising paradigm to achieve efficient utilization of spectrum resource by allowing the unlicensed users (i.e., secondary users, SUs) to access the licensed spectrum. Market-driven spectrum trading is an efficient way to achieve dynamic spectrum accessing/sharing. In this paper, we consider the problem of spectrum trading with single primary spectrum owner (or primary user, PO) selling his idle spectrum to multiple SUs. We model the trading process as a monopoly market, in which the PO acts as monopolist who sets the qualities and prices for the spectrum he sells, and the SUs act as consumers who choose the spectrum with appropriate quality and price for purchasing. We design a monopolist-dominated quality-price contract, which is offered by the PO and contains a set of quality-price combinations each intended for a consumer type. A contract is feasible if it is incentive compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR) for each SU to purchase the spectrum with the quality-price intended for his type. We propose the necessary and sufficient conditions for the contract to be feasible. We further derive the optimal contract, which is feasible and maximizes the utility of the PO, for both discrete-consumer-type model and continuous-consumer-type model. Moreover, we analyze the social surplus, i.e., the aggregate utility of both PO and SUs, and we find that, depending on the distribution of consumer types, the social surplus under the optimal contract may be less than or close to the maximum social surplus.