Towards an accurate AS-level traceroute tool
Proceedings of the 2003 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
SIGMETRICS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
In search for an appropriate granularity to model routing policies
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Understanding the efficacy of deployed internet source address validation filtering
Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
Internet censorship in china: where does the filtering occur?
PAM'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Passive and active measurement
Let the market drive deployment: a strategy for transitioning to BGP security
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 conference
Detecting and assessing the hybrid IPv4/IPv6 as relationships
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2011 conference
On the incompleteness of the AS-level graph: a novel methodology for BGP route collector placement
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Internet measurement conference
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On Monday, 22 August 2011, CAIDA hosted a one-day workshop to discuss scalable measurement and analysis of BGP and traceroute topology data, and practical applications of such data analysis including tracking of macroscopic censorship and filtering activities on the Internet. Discussion topics included: the surprisingly stability in the number of BGP updates over time; techniques for improving measurement and analysis of inter-domain routing policies; an update on Colorado State's BGPMon instrumentation; using BGP data to improve the interpretation of traceroute data, both for real-time diagnostics (e.g., AS traceroute) and for large-scale topology mapping; using both BGP and traceroute data to support detection and mapping infrastructure integrity, including different types of of filtering and censorship; and use of BGP data to analyze existing and proposed approaches to securing the interdomain routing system. This report briefly summarizes the presentations and discussions that followed.