Co-evolution of the dynamics in population games: the case of traffic flow assignment

  • Authors:

  • Ana L.C. Bazzan

  • Affiliations:

  • Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 14th annual conference companion on Genetic and evolutionary computation
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In population games, one of the main interests is the evolution of the dynamics, i.e., how the distribution of individuals change along time. This is an abstract but elegant way to model population of drivers selecting routes. In this paper, a three-population asymmetric game is used to investigate the co-evolution of drivers' strategies. It is shown that the convergence to one of the Nash equilibria is achieved when the three populations co-evolve, under different rates of mutants in these populations.