Revising Carnap's Semantic Conception of Modality

  • Authors:

  • Toby Meadows

  • Affiliations:

  • Discipline of Philosophy, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

  • Venue:
  • Studia Logica
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

I provide a tableau system and completeness proof for a revised version of Carnap's semantics for quantified modal logic. For Carnap, a sentence is possible if it is true in some first order model. However, in a similar fashion to second order logic, no sound and complete proof theory can be provided for this semantics. This factor contributed to the ultimate disappearance of Carnapian modal logic from contemporary philosophical discussion. The proof theory I discuss comes close to Carnap's semantic vision and provides an interesting counterpoint to mainstream approaches to modal logic. Despite its historical origins, my intention is to demonstrate that this approach to modal logic is worthy of contemporary attention and that current debate is the poorer for its absence.