Conditioning and Interpretation Shifts

Authors:
Jan-Willem Romeijn
Affiliations:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands 9712 GL
Venue:
Studia Logica
Year:
2012

Citing 8
Cited 0

A model-theoretic analysis of knowledge

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Reasoning about Information Change

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Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Dynamic Epistemic Logic

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Abstract

This paper develops a probabilistic model of belief change under interpretation shifts, in the context of a problem case from dynamic epistemic logic. Van Benthem [4] has shown that a particular kind of belief change, typical for dynamic epistemic logic, cannot be modelled by standard Bayesian conditioning. I argue that the problems described by van Benthem come about because the belief change alters the semantics in which the change is supposed to be modelled: the new information induces a shift in the interpretation of the sentences. In this paper I show that interpretation shifts can be modeled in terms of updating by conditioning. The model derives from the knowledge structures developed by Fagin et al [8], and hinges on a distinction between the propositional and informational content of sentences. Finally, I show that Dempster-Shafer theory provides the appropriate probability kinematics for the model.