Bargaining under two-sided incomplete information: the unrestricted offers case
Operations Research
Inventory control with an exponential utility criterion
Operations Research
Correlated Equilibrium in Quitting Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
Mathematics of Operations Research
A General Equilibrium Model for Industries with Price and Service Competition
Operations Research
The Value of Zero-Sum Stopping Games in Continuous Time
SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
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In many situations, such as trade in stock exchanges, agents have many opportunities to act within a short interval of time. The agents in such situations can often coordinate their actions in advance, but coordination during the game consumes too much time. An equilibrium in such situations has to be sequential in order to handle mistakes made by players. In this paper, we present a new solution concept for infinite-horizon dynamic games, which is appropriate for such situations: a sequential normal-form correlated approximate equilibrium. Under additional assumptions, we show that every such game admits this kind of equilibrium.