An axiomatic basis for computer programming
Communications of the ACM
Dynamic Logic
Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
PODC '84 Proceedings of the third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The logic of public announcements, common knowledge, and private suspicions
The logic of public announcements, common knowledge, and private suspicions
A logic for perception and belief
A logic for perception and belief
Logics of communication and change
Information and Computation
Agents in approximate environments
Games, Actions and Social Software
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
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Three key ways of updating one's knowledge are (i) perception of states of affairs, e.g., seeing with one's own eyes that something is the case, (ii) reception of messages, e.g., being told that something is the case, and (iii) drawing new conclusions from known facts. If one represents knowledge by means of Kripke models, the implicit assumption is that drawing conclusions is immediate. This assumption of logical omniscience is a useful abstraction. It leaves the distinction between (i) and (ii) to be accounted for. In current versions of Update Logic (Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Logic of Communication and Change) perception and message reception are not distinguished. This chapter proposes an extension of Update Logic that makes this distinction explicit. The logic deals with three kinds of updates: announcements, changes of the world, and observations about the world in the presence of witnesses. The resulting logic is shown to be complete by means of a reduction to epistemic propositional dynamic logic by a well-known method.