Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
k-anonymous secret handshakes with reusable credentials
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secret Handshake: Strong Anonymity Definition and Construction
ISPEC '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Secret handshakes with revocation support
ICISC'09 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information security and cryptology
A new revocable secret handshake scheme with backward unlinkability
EuroPKI'10 Proceedings of the 7th European conference on Public key infrastructures, services and applications
An efficient group signature scheme from bilinear maps
ACISP'05 Proceedings of the 10th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
A flexible framework for secret handshakes
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Authentication for paranoids: multi-party secret handshakes
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Group secret handshakes or affiliation-hiding authenticated group key agreement
CT-RSA'07 Proceedings of the 7th Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Secret handshake scheme with request-based-revealing
Computers & Mathematics with Applications
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Secret handshake (SH) schemes enable two members who belong to the same group to authenticate each other in a way that hides their affiliation to that group from all others. In previous works, the group authority (GA) has the ability to reveal the identity (ID) of a handshake player who belongs to his group. In this paper, we focus first on the classification of traceability of GA. We classify this feature as follows: (i) GA of G is able to reveal IDs of members belonging to G by using a transcript of a handshake protocol; (ii) GA of G is able to confirm whether handshake players belong to G or not by using a transcript of a handshake protocol. In some situations, only the latter capability is needed. So, we consider a SH that GA has only an ability to confirm whether a handshake player belongs to his own group without revealing his ID. Thus, we introduce a SH scheme with request-based-revealing (SHRBR). In SHRBR, GA can check whether handshake players belong to the own group without revealing a member ID. After a handshake player A executes a handshake protocol with B , if A wants to reveal a handshake partner (in this case B ), A requests GA to reveal a handshake partner's ID by bringing forth his own ID and secret information. We define the security requirements for SHRBR and propose a concrete SHRBR in the random oracle model.