Cantina: a content-based approach to detecting phishing web sites
Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
A framework for detection and measurement of phishing attacks
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Recurring malcode
You've been warned: an empirical study of the effectiveness of web browser phishing warnings
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Identifying suspicious URLs: an application of large-scale online learning
ICML '09 Proceedings of the 26th Annual International Conference on Machine Learning
Beyond blacklists: learning to detect malicious web sites from suspicious URLs
Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Detection and analysis of drive-by-download attacks and malicious JavaScript code
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World wide web
Prophiler: a fast filter for the large-scale detection of malicious web pages
Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
The nuts and bolts of a forum spam automator
LEET'11 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats
ZOZZLE: fast and precise in-browser JavaScript malware detection
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
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In the real world, risk is never binary but always comes in shades of grey. When security systems treat risk as a purely boolean process, they're prone to failure because the quantisation that's required in order to produce a boolean result has to over- or under-estimate the actual risk. What's worse, if an all-or-nothing system like this fails, it fails completely, with no fallback position available to catch errors. Drawing on four decades of experience with security design for the built environment (buildings and houses) known as crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), this paper looks at how CPTED is applied in practice and, using browser PKI as the best-known example of large-scale certificate use, examines certificates as part of a CPTED-style risk-mitigation system that isn't prone to all-or-nothing failures and that neatly integrates concepts like EV vs. DV vs. OV and OCSP vs. non-checked certificates into the risk-assessment process, as well as dealing with the too-big-to-fail problem of trusted browser CAs.