Scalable high speed IP routing lookups
SIGCOMM '97 Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM '97 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Space Efficient Hash Tables with Worst Case Constant Access Time
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Journal of Algorithms
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Fast hash table lookup using extended bloom filter: an aid to network processing
Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Backtracking Algorithmic Complexity Attacks against a NIDS
ACSAC '06 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Denial of service via algorithmic complexity attacks
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
More Robust Hashing: Cuckoo Hashing with a Stash
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
An Analysis of Random-Walk Cuckoo Hashing
APPROX '09 / RANDOM '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Workshop and 13th International Workshop on Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
Massively Parallel Cuckoo Pattern Matching Applied for NIDS/NIPS
DELTA '10 Proceedings of the 2010 Fifth IEEE International Symposium on Electronic Design, Test & Applications
The power of one move: hashing schemes for hardware
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Peacock and Cuckoo hashing schemes are currently the most studied hash implementations for hardware network systems (such as NIDS, Firewalls, etc.). In this work we evaluate their vulnerability to sophisticated complexity Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. We show that an attacker can use insertion of carefully selected keys to hit the Peacock and Cuckoo hashing schemes at their weakest points. For the Peacock Hashing, we show that after the attacker fills up only a fraction (typically 5%−10%) of the buckets, the table completely loses its ability to handle collisions, causing the discard rate (of new keys) to increase dramatically (100−1,800 times higher). For the Cuckoo Hashing, we show an attack that can impose on the system an excessive number of memory accesses and degrade its performance. We analyze the vulnerability of the system as a function of the critical parameters and provide simulations results as well.