Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Computers and Operations Research
A study of non-neutral networks with usage-based prices
ETM'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Incentives, overlays, and economic traffic control
The Debate on Net Neutrality: A Policy Perspective
Information Systems Research
Price of anarchy in non-cooperative load balancing games
Performance Evaluation
In which content to specialize? a game theoretic analysis
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Networking
Proceedings of the 24th International Teletraffic Congress
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We study competition between users over access to content in a telecom market that includes several access providers and several content providers. We focus situations where exclusive agreements exist between content and access providers, which allows access providers to offer content services for free for their subscribers. We call access providers having such agreements "super" providers or "enhanced" service providers. We show that the competition between the users results in a paradoxical phenomenon in which subscribers of enhanced providers prefer to defer part of their demand to other content providers whose content is costly. We show how this phenomena can be exploited by the content providers so as to maximize their benefits.