A General Equilibrium Model for Industries with Price and Service Competition
Operations Research
Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
Mathematics of Operations Research
Reputation Based Access Point Selection in 802.11 Network
ICCIT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Third International Conference on Convergence and Hybrid Information Technology - Volume 02
Price war with partial spectrum sharing for competitive wireless service providers
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Technological investment games among wireless telecommunications service providers
International Journal of Network Management
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We present a model of competition on prices between two telecommunication service providers sharing an access resource, which can for example be the same WiFi spectrum. We obtain a two-level game corresponding to two time scales of decisions: at the smallest time scale, users play an association game by choosing their provider (or none) depending on price, provider reputation and congestion level, and at the largest time scale, providers compete on prices. We show that the association game always has an equilibrium, but that several can exist. The pricing game is then solved by assuming that providers are risk-averse and try to maximize the minimal revenue they can get at a user equilibrium. We illustrate what can be the outcome of this game and that there are situations for which providers can co-exist.