Short Signatures from the Weil Pairing
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Privacy and Ownership Preserving of Outsourced Medical Data
ICDE '05 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Data Engineering
HIPAA's Effect on Web Site Privacy Policies
IEEE Security and Privacy
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Efficient Robust Private Set Intersection
ACNS '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Private Intersection of Certified Sets
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Privacy-Preserving Policy-Based Information Transfer
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Fast secure computation of set intersection
SCN'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Security and cryptography for networks
Keyword search and oblivious pseudorandom functions
TCC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Privacy-preserving set operations
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Practical private set intersection protocols with linear complexity
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Efficient set operations in the presence of malicious adversaries
PKC'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
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Companies, organizations, and individuals often wish to share information to realize valuable social and economic goals. Unfortunately, privacy concerns often stand in the way of such information sharing and exchange. This paper proposes a novel cryptographic paradigm called Policy-Enhanced Private Set Intersection (PPSI ), allowing two parties to share information while enforcing the desired privacy policies. Our constructions require minimal additional overhead over traditional Private Set Intersection (PSI) protocols, and yet we can handle rich policy semantics previously not possible with traditional PSI and Authorized Private Set Intersection (APSI) protocols. Our scheme involves running a standard PSI protocol over carefully crafted encodings of elements formed as part of a challenge-response mechanism. The structure of these encodings resemble techniques used for aggregating BLS signatures in bilinear groups. We prove that our scheme is secure in the malicious model, under the CBDH assumption, the random oracle model, and the assumption that the underlying PSI protocol is secure against malicious adversaries.