Characterizing Kripke structures in temporal logic
The International Joint Conference on theory and practice of software development on TAPSOFT '87
Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
Reasoning about knowledge
Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science
Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science
MFCS '98 Proceedings of the 23rd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
The logic of public announcements, common knowledge, and private suspicions
TARK '98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Logics of communication and change
Information and Computation
Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Awareness and Forgetting of Facts and Agents
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 03
Twelve angry men: a study on the fine-grain of announcements
LORI'09 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Logic, rationality and interaction
Becoming aware of propositional variables
ICLA'11 Proceedings of the 4th Indian conference on Logic and its applications
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We consider semantic structures and logics that differentiate between being uncertain about a proposition, being un-aware of a proposition, becoming aware of a proposition and getting to know the truth value of a proposition. We give a unified setting to model all this variety of static and dynamic aspects of awareness and knowledge, without any constraints on the modal properties of knowledge (or belief --- such as introspection) or on the interaction between awareness and knowledge (such as awareness introspection). Our primitive epistemic operator is called speculative knowledge. This is different from the better known implicit knowledge, now definable, which plays a more restricted role. Some dynamic semantic primitives that are elegantly definable in our setting are the actions of 'becoming aware of a propositional variable', 'implicit knowledge', 'addressing a novel issue in an announcement', and also more complex ways in which an agent can become aware of a novel issue by way of increasing the complexity of the epistemic model.