The evolution of metanorms: quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
Altruistic punishment, social structure and the enforcement of social norms
KES'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems - Volume Part III
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Yamamoto et. al.[6] have discovered that cooperation can be robustly maintained in a metanorms game by introducing into the population a small number of agents that always act non-cooperatively. They call this a "social vaccine" effect. In this paper we focus on the implications of a social vaccine. We therefore consider a model where there is a constant flow of newcomers into the population. How strictly should non-cooperators be eliminated from the newcomers in such a model? In this paper, by assuming a case where cooperative participants and non-cooperative participants are trying to participate in a population where metanorms are functioning, we investigate how well cooperation within the population is maintained by a strict population management policy where only cooperative participants are allowed to participate, and a simple population management policy where non-cooperative participants are admitted to some extent.