Fundamentals of computer security technology
Fundamentals of computer security technology
Performance and reliability analysis of computer systems: an example-based approach using the SHARPE software package
Experimenting with Quantitative Evaluation Tools for Monitoring Operational Security
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Secrets & Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World
Secrets & Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World
Model-Based Evaluation: From Dependability to Security
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Defense trees for economic evaluation of security investments
ARES '06 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
A risk-driven security analysis method and modelling language
BT Technology Journal
Accurate Real-time Identification of IP Prefix Hijacking
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Novel Security Risk Evaluation for Information Systems
FCST '07 Proceedings of the 2007 Japan-China Joint Workshop on Frontier of Computer Science and Technology
A framework for analyzing and mitigating the vulnerabilities of complex systems via attack and protection trees
SHARPE at the age of twenty two
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
Strategic games on defense trees
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
Developing an insider threat model using functional decomposition
MMM-ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Mathematical Methods, Models, and Architectures for Computer Network Security
ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Attribute Decoration of Attack-Defense Trees
International Journal of Secure Software Engineering
Quantitative questions on attack: defense trees
ICISC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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Attack tree (AT) is one of the widely used non-state-space models for security analysis. The basic formalism of AT does not take into account defense mechanisms. Defense trees (DTs) have been developed to investigate the effect of defense mechanisms using measures such as attack cost, security investment cost, return on attack (ROA), and return on investment (ROI). DT, however, places defense mechanisms only at the leaf nodes and the corresponding ROI/ROA analysis does not incorporate the probabilities of attack. In attack response tree (ART), attack and response are both captured but ART suffers from the problem of state-space explosion, since solution of ART is obtained by means of a state-space model. In this paper, we present a novel attack tree paradigm called attack countermeasure tree (ACT) which avoids the generation and solution of a state-space model and takes into account attacks as well as countermeasures (in the form of detection and mitigation events). In ACT, detection and mitigation are allowed not just at the leaf node but also at the intermediate nodes while at the same time the state-space explosion problem is avoided in its analysis. We study the consequences of incorporating countermeasures in the ACT using three case studies (ACT for BGP attack, ACT for a SCADA attack and ACT for malicious insider attacks). Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.