Dynamic fine-grained localization in Ad-Hoc networks of sensors
Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Detecting Malicious Beacon Nodes for Secure Location Discovery in Wireless Sensor Networks
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
A Selective Anchor Node Localization Algorithm for Wireless Sensor Networks
ICCIT '07 Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on Convergence Information Technology
Tolerant majority-colluding attacks for secure localization in wireless sensor networks
WiCOM'09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Wireless communications, networking and mobile computing
Detection of the Evil ring attack in wireless sensor networks using cross verification
WOWMOM '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE International Symposium on A World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM)
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There exists extensive work in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) on security measures that guarantee the correctness of the estimation of the position of a node despite attacks from adversaries. But very little work has investigated how colluding attackers can modify the behavior of known attacks or even create new ones. In this paper, we first present an attack model that allows three types of colluding attackers to threaten the secure localization process and/or the attacker detection process. We then describe a decentralized algorithm that is used to determine the position of a location-unknown sensor U despite the presence of colluding attackers (that can alter any type of information being exchanged in a WSN in order to form an attack jointly). Most importantly, the proposed algorithm allows U to detect such colluding attackers in its sensing range. Our simulation results show that in both a uniformly deployed WSN environment and in a randomly deployed one, our Super Cross Check algorithm can achieve a high success rate for both secure localization and detection of colluding attackers.