On the worst-case complexity of integer Gaussian elimination
ISSAC '97 Proceedings of the 1997 international symposium on Symbolic and algebraic computation
Communications of the ACM
Executing SQL over encrypted data in the database-service-provider model
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
Order preserving encryption for numeric data
SIGMOD '04 Proceedings of the 2004 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
Privacy Preserving Query Processing Using Third Parties
ICDE '06 Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Data Engineering
Database Management as a Service: Challenges and Opportunities
ICDE '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Data Engineering
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Keep a few: outsourcing data while maintaining confidentiality
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Privacy preserving query processing on secret share based data storage
DASFAA'11 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Database systems for advanced applications - Volume Part I
Query processing in private data outsourcing using anonymization
DBSec'11 Proceedings of the 25th annual IFIP WG 11.3 conference on Data and applications security and privacy
Aggregation queries in the database-as-a-service model
DBSEC'06 Proceedings of the 20th IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and Applications Security
Security issues in querying encrypted data
DBSec'05 Proceedings of the 19th annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and Applications Security
Compromising privacy in precise query protocols
Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Extending Database Technology
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Three recently proposed schemes use secret sharing to support privacy-preserving data outsourcing. Each secret in the database is split into n shares, which are distributed to independent data servers. A trusted client can use any k shares to reconstruct the secret. These schemes claim to offer security even when k or more servers collude, as long as certain information such as the finite field prime is known only to the client. We present a concrete attack that refutes this claim by demonstrating that security is lost in all three schemes when k or more servers collude. Our attack runs on commodity hardware and recovers a 8192-bit prime and all secret values in less than an hour for k=8.