Reconstruction attack through classifier analysis

  • Authors:
  • Sébastien Gambs;Ahmed Gmati;Michel Hurfin

  • Affiliations:
  • Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires, Université de Rennes 1, Rennes Cedex, France, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique, INRIA R ...;Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires, Université de Rennes 1, Rennes Cedex, France;Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique, INRIA Rennes - Bretagne Atlantique, France

  • Venue:
  • DBSec'12 Proceedings of the 26th Annual IFIP WG 11.3 conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a novel inference attack that we coin as the reconstruction attack whose objective is to reconstruct a probabilistic version of the original dataset on which a classifier was learnt from the description of this classifier and possibly some auxiliary information. In a nutshell, the reconstruction attack exploits the structure of the classifier in order to derive a probabilistic version of dataset on which this model has been trained. Moreover, we propose a general framework that can be used to assess the success of a reconstruction attack in terms of a novel distance between the reconstructed and original datasets. In case of multiple releases of classifiers, we also give a strategy that can be used to merge the different reconstructed datasets into a single coherent one that is closer to the original dataset than any of the simple reconstructed datasets. Finally, we give an instantiation of this reconstruction attack on a decision tree classifier that was learnt using the algorithm C4.5 and evaluate experimentally its efficiency. The results of this experimentation demonstrate that the proposed attack is able to reconstruct a significant part of the original dataset, thus highlighting the need to develop new learning algorithms whose output is specifically tailored to mitigate the success of this type of attack.