Automated Analysis of Diffie-Hellman Protocols and Advanced Security Properties

Authors:
Benedikt Schmidt;Simon Meier;Cas Cremers;David Basin
Affiliations:
-;-;-;-
Venue:
CSF '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Year:
2012

Citing 0
Cited 3

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Journal of Computer Security

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Abstract

We present a general approach for the symbolic analysis of security protocols that use Diffie-Hellman exponentiation to achieve advanced security properties. We model protocols as multiset rewriting systems and security properties as first-order formulas. We analyze them using a novel constraint-solving algorithm that supports both falsification and verification, even in the presence of an unbounded number of protocol sessions. The algorithm exploits the finite variant property and builds on ideas from strand spaces and proof normal forms. We demonstrate the scope and the effectiveness of our algorithm on non-trivial case studies. For example, the algorithm successfully verifies the NAXOS protocol with respect to a symbolic version of the eCK security model.