Computational verification of C protocol implementations by symbolic execution
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
Probabilistic relational verification for cryptographic implementations
Proceedings of the 41st ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages
Type-based analysis of key management in PKCS#11 cryptographic devices
Journal of Computer Security - Security and Trust Principles
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We consider the problem of establishing cryptographic guarantees -- in particular, computational indistinguishability -- for Java or Java-like programs that use cryptography. For this purpose, we propose a general framework that enables existing program analysis tools that can check (standard) non-interference properties of Java programs to establish cryptographic security guarantees, even if the tools a priori cannot deal with cryptography. The approach that we take is new and combines techniques from program analysis and simulation-based security. Our framework is stated and proved for a Java-like language that comprises a rich fragment of Java. The general idea of our approach should, however, be applicable also to other practical programming languages. As a proof of concept, we use an automatic program analysis tool for checking non-interference properties of Java programs, namely the tool Joana, in order to establish computational indistinguishability for a Java program that involves clients sending encrypted messages over a network, controlled by an active adversary, to a server.