Analysis and design of stream ciphers
Analysis and design of stream ciphers
Finite fields
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
SAC '00 Proceedings of the 7th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Signal Design for Good Correlation: For Wireless Communication, Cryptography, and Radar
Signal Design for Good Correlation: For Wireless Communication, Cryptography, and Radar
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Higher order correlation attacks, XL algorithm and cryptanalysis of Toyocrypt
ICISC'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Algebraic attacks on stream ciphers with linear feedback
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
On the security of the LILI family of stream ciphers against algebraic attacks
ACISP'07 Proceedings of the 12th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Open problems related to algebraic attacks on stream ciphers
WCC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Coding and Cryptography
Introducing a new variant of fast algebraic attacks and minimizing their successive data complexity
Mycrypt'05 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Progress in Cryptology in Malaysia
Resistance of SNOW 2.0 against algebraic attacks
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
An analysis of the structure and complexity of nonlinear binary sequence generators
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
A New Attack on the Filter Generator
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Fast Discrete Fourier Spectra Attacks on Stream Ciphers
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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The nonlinear filter generator (NLFG) is a powerful building block commonly used in stream ciphers. In this paper, we present the direct sum decomposition of the NLFG output sequence that leads to a system of linear equations in the initial state of the NLFG and further to an efficient algebraic attack. The coefficients of the equation system rely only on the NLFG structure. The attack is operated in an online/offline manner, doing most of the work (determining the coefficients of the equation system) in the offline phase. Thus the online phase is very fast, requiring only four multiplications and one diagonalization of n×n matrices. Compared with related works, our attack has the advantages in both online computation cost and success probability. On the one hand, far fewer output bits and significantly less matrix computation are required in our attack, although the online computation complexity O(LC) (LC is the linear complexity of the output sequence) is the same as in the known Rønjom-Helleseth attack. On the other hand, the success probability of the attack is analyzed in this paper, different from most prior work. The success probability of this algebraic attack is $1-2^{-\phi(2^n-1)}$ (φ(·) is the Euler function), which is much greater than 1−2−n, the success probability of the Rønjom-Helleseth attack.