Private fingerprint matching

Authors:
Siamak F. Shahandashti;Reihaneh Safavi-Naini;Philip Ogunbona
Affiliations:
University of Paris 8 and École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France;Institute for Security, Privacy, and Info. Assurance, University of Calgary, Canada;ICT Research Institute, University of Wollongong, Australia
Venue:
ACISP'12 Proceedings of the 17th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
Year:
2012

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Abstract

We propose a fully private fingerprint matching protocol that compares two fingerprints based on the most widely-used minutia-based fingerprint matching algorithm. The protocol enables two parties, each holding a private fingerprint, to find out if their fingerprints belong to the same individual. Unlike previous works, we do not make any simplifying assumption on the matching algorithm or use generic multiparty computation protocols in our constructions. We employ a commonly-used algorithm that works by first comparing minutia pairs from the two fingerprints based on their types, locations, and orientations, and then checking if the number of matching minutia pairs is more than a threshold, and we propose a concrete, scalable, and modular protocol. We prove security against honest-but-curious adversaries and discuss how security against malicious adversaries can be achieved using standard cryptographic techniques. Our protocol is realized using common cryptographic primitives and do not require pairing- or lattice-based cryptography.