Some applications of multiple key ciphers
Lecture Notes in Computer Science on Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'88
Using CSP to Detect Errors in the TMN Protocol
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Cryptographic solution to a problem of access control in a hierarchy
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Communications of the ACM
A cryptographic solution to implement access control in a hierarchy and more
SACMAT '02 Proceedings of the seventh ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice
Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice
Applying hierarchical and role-based access control to XML documents
SWS '04 Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on Secure web service
Controlling access to published data using cryptography
VLDB '03 Proceedings of the 29th international conference on Very large data bases - Volume 29
Dynamic and Efficient Key Management for Access Hierarchies
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Structured communication-centred programming for web services
ESOP'07 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Programming
FM'06 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Formal Methods
Algebraic framework for the verification of confidentiality properties
Algebraic framework for the verification of confidentiality properties
A generic algebraic model for the analysis of cryptographic-key assignment schemes
FPS'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Foundations and Practice of Security
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Several organizations generate and store a wide range of information in what is commonly referred to as data stores. To access the information within these data stores, two main architectures are widely adopted. The first architecture gives access to information through a trusted server that enforces established confidentiality policies. The second one allows the information to be public but in its encrypted form. Then through a scheme for the distribution of cryptographic keys, each user is provided with the keys needed to decrypt only the part of the information she is authorized to access. This paper relates to the latter architecture. We introduce an algebraic framework that takes into consideration a new perspective in tackling the key-distribution problem. We use the proposed framework to analyze key-distribution schemes that are representative of the ones found in the literature. The framework enables the specification and the verification of key-distribution policies. We also point to several other applications related to measures ensuring information confidentiality.